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Abstract 
This paper deals with an efficient key distribution scheme which is useful to secure data-centric routing protocols in 
Wireless Sensor Networks. Similar to these routing protocols, the proposed scheme bootstraps secure key distribution 
with a centralized process which gives a multi-level hierarchical organization to WSNs.  The originality of this work 
is to permit to use local key distribution process to establish Group Key and Pairwise Key. These two types of keys 
are useful to secure respectively data request diffusion and data forwarding through multi-hop routing paths. 
Moreover, when the WSN topology changes, the proposed scheme allows secure WSN reorganization. Security 
analysis explains that our proposed scheme can withstand several possible attacks against WSNs. A comparison to 
other solutions based on one KDC shows that the proposed scheme is significantly more efficient and scalable. This 
is well verified through simulations with TOSSIM under TinyOS using NesC language 
Keywords: Wireless sensor networks; key distribution scheme; secure routing; data-centric routing protocol
1. Introduction 
Many routing protocols are proposed to Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [1]. However, in hostile 
environment, there are many attacks against WSNs and especially against routing protocols [2]. When 
routing protocol is compromised, there are fatal consequences on sensor network functioning like low 
availability, data diversion, energy dissipation and network disturbance. Security services  for routing 
protocols are based on symmetric cryptographic algorithms which need key distribution mechanisms. In 
literature, some key establishment schemes are proposed for WSNs. However, most of them take in 
consideration neither the WSN organization nor the bootstrapping of the organization process 
(centralized, distributed…). In this paper, we are interested in proposing an efficient key distribution 
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scheme to secure data-centric routing protocols in homogenous WSNs. Thus, we suppose that sensor 
nodes have the same capabilities. In addition, they are deployed randomly in the investigated field.  
The studied routing protocols are bootstrapped with a centralized process and provide a hierarchical 
organization to the WSN[3][4][5][6][7]. We recommend that the proposed key distribution scheme should 
be easily joined to the secure data-centric routing protocols. It must be able to share efficiently three types 
of keys: Global Key, Group Key and Pairwise Key to secure different communication patterns: one to all, 
one to many and one to one. Also, the proposed scheme should permit a secure WSN reorganization. 
This paper is organized as follow: section 2 represents the background needed for our work, section 3 
describes the key distribution scheme; section 4 contains a security analysis against the most known 
routing attacks; section 5 compares the scheme with other solutions; section 6 carries out simulations and 
results; section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Background 
Routing in data-centric protocols is not based on address but rather on sensed data. Initially, the base 
station broadcasts a “Data Request” message. Sensor node which receives this message proceeds to 
broadcasted it again to all neighbors. After a period of time, “Data Request” messages arrive to the entire 
network. If a sensor node disposes data which satisfies the request, it sends a “Data Response” message 
via the best gradient (router). Data-centric routing protocols make it possible in-network processing 
(delete of redundant data, aggregation). It results from it a reduction of sending thereafter a reduction of 
possible collisions on the transmission channel.  These aspects lead to energy saving and increasing 
network lifespan. For next interests, “Data Request” message can be sent by multi-cast to group nodes or 
by uni-cast to specific node. In the following, we give more details about data-centric routing protocols. 
For « Directed Diffusion » [3], “Data Request” message represents an interest to data.  Interest 
messages support attributes naming which specify a set of constraints to be met by sensed data which sink 
node expects, like class of data. It is possible to specify other parameters such as the interest expiration 
and the sending frequency. Thereafter, sensor nodes with data matching these constraints send data 
messages via all gradients. Whereas for « One Phase Pull » [4] –a lightweight variant of Directed 
Diffusion– data messages are sent back along the fastest gradient from which the first interest message 
was received. In « Flooding and Gossiping » [5] “Data Response” messages are sent randomly among one 
of the gradients. This allows load balancing and avoids having famous nodes. Whereas, for « Energy-
aware routing » [6], routing metric is a function of consumed energy throughout the routing path. For 
« Gradient based routing » [7], sensor nodes keep the number of hops when the “Data Request” message 
is diffused through the network. Therefore, each node can discover the minimum number of hops to the 
sink, which is called height of the node. Thus, “Data Response” messages are forwarded via routing path 
having minimum gradients.  
On the other hand, different key distribution schemes for WSNs are proposed in literature [8] [9]: 
• Public key schemes: with limited resources, sensor nodes cannot employ sophisticated public key 
cryptographs. Though, some work on ECC promises easy key management but this is for 
heterogeneous WSNs where routers dispose most capabilities [10]. 
• Single network-wide key: a single key is preloaded into all nodes of the network. For example, 
Tinysec [11] proceeds with a single network-wide key along deployment phase.  The main drawback 
is that the compromise of a single node causes the compromise of the entire network. 
• Complete Pairwise Key sharing: for a network of n nodes, (n-1) Pairwise keys are retained in each 
node’s memory. This approach is not scalable. 
• Random key pre-distribution scheme: in this scheme, a pool of keys is initially pre-loaded into each 
sensor. After this, sensor nodes undergo a distributed discovery process to set up shared key for secure 
communications [12]. This scheme isn’t convenient to a centralized bootstrapping communication. 
Also it doesn’t ensure that two nodes are always able to compute a Pairwise Key. 
• Hierarchical key management: it supports various secure communication patterns: unicast, multicast 
and global broadcast. LEAP+ [13] is referred to as the basic scheme of hierarchical key management. 
LEAP+ initially establishes Pairwise Key with a distributed process. This isn’t the case of the above 
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routing protocols where communication is bootstrapped with a centralized process. 
•  Key Distribution Center: in this scheme [14], base station sends a session key to secure 
communication between any two nodes. The scheme has small memory requirement. It is resilient to 
node capture and possible to revoke key pairs. The main drawback of such scheme that is not scalable. 
3. Description of the proposed scheme 
Considering the particularity of routing in WSNs where “Data Response” messages are forwarded 
mainly to the base station, therefore "Data Request” messages received from nodes with higher height 
(further from the base station) will be rejected. In fact, for «Directed Diffusion» and «One Phase Pull» an 
interest message which is received from a data gradient is dropped. For « Energy-aware routing » 
protocol, routing path which contains subordinate nodes is obviously more expensive in terms of 
expended energy. For « Flooding and Gossiping » and « Gradient based routing », “Data Response” 
messages are forwarded towards base station. Consequently subordinate nodes shouldn’t belong to 
routing paths. Also in MTE [15], it is shown that sending via an intermediate node induced less dissipated 
energy than a direct communication. As a result, in the proposed key distribution scheme, each sensor 
node will seek to share Pairwisekey with nodes (routers) having little or equal height. Thereafter, the 
routing metrics determine the best gradient. On the other hand, the hierarchical organization of the WSN 
offered by the routing protocols dedicates to establish Group Key for each group of nodes.  
More precisely, the proposed key distribution scheme will have the following objectives:  
• To perform a secure hierarchical organization of  the WSN, 
• To establish Group Key and Pairwise key, 
• To cause low storage, computation and communication overhead  
• To permit a secure reorganization of the WSN and to permit key refresh. 
To reach the above objectives, the key distribution scheme must takes account of some characteristics:
• The studied routing protocols use a centralized process (initiated by the base station) to organize the 
WSN, then the key distribution process will proceed, in the same way, to give a secure organization. 
• The first broadcast will be protected with a preloaded Global Key.    
• The process to establish Group Key and PairwiseKey  should be performed locally, 
The key distribution scheme will need two phases to perform all these functionalities. Table 1 displays 
the notations used in this description. 
Table 1. Notations table 
Notation Description 
BS  Base Station 
N Sensor Node 
GH Group Head 
* Broadcast address 
A || B  Data A concatenated with data B 
MACK(A)  MAC calculated and encrypted with a Key K 
EncKey(A)  Encrypt data A with a Key K 
3.1 Phase1: Secure organization of the WSN and Group Key distribution 
Each node is preloaded with a Global Key. As the WSN is deployed, the base station proceeds by a 
secure broadcast of a “Path Discovery” message to trace routing paths. Eventually, this message will be 
used to distribute Group Key. To determine easily node level, a height field is added to the message. The 
height value received in the first message determines the node level. 
BS   * :   * || BS || Nonce|| height || EncGlobalKey(GroupKey) || MACGlobalKey
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Each node N receiving a secure “Path Discovery”, it rebroadcasts this message after having been 
treated as it is shown in the flowchart (a) of Fig. 1.  When the “Path Discovery” diffusion is achieved, the 
WSN is organized securely in hierarchical groups. More precisely, intermediate nodes are Group Head; 
each node N belongs to one or more groups with which it shares a Group Key. Finally, each sensor node 
deletes the preloaded Global Key from its memory.  
The use of the Global Key is well limited in time. This reduces the impact of a tamper attack only to 
links with immediate neighbours and not to the entire network. It is important to say that the broadcast 
duration for various sizes must be taken into account. It shouldn’t exceed the necessary minimum time so 
that an attacker reveals information stored in a sensor. Studies carried out in [16] showed that it takes at 
least 10 seconds to tamper a captured node. Since, several techniques were proposed to protect sensors 
against tampering. But tamper-proof sensor nodes are more expensive. Reminding that the key 
distribution scheme is proposed for homogeneous WSNs,   we will keep 10 seconds as the necessary 
minimum time to reveal information from ordinary sensor node.  
3.2. Phase 2: Pairwise Key distribution 
At the end of “Path Discovery” diffusion, a node N sends a secure message “Join Group Request” to 
their Group Heads. Eventually, this message will be useful to share with each of them a Pairwise Key. 
N  GH :   GH || N || Nonce|| EncGroupKey(PairwiseKey) || MACGroupKey
Thus, for each entry in the “Group Head cash” a node N proceeds as it is shown in first part of the 
flowchart (b) of Fig.1. When a “Join Group Request” message is received by a Group Head, it proceeds 
like it is shown in the second part of the flowchart (b) of Fig.1. The “Join Group Response” message is 
sent to a member group node N to confirm secure link: 
GH  N :   N || GH || Nonce|| MACPairwiseKey 
When phase 2 is achieved, a node N shares a Pairwise key with each Group Head (candidate router). 
After that, routing protocol determines the best gradient (router) towards base station. 
3.3. Secure deployment of routing protocols  
Once the two above phases are completed, the WSN is organized with a secure process which provides 
to each node secure link with candidate routers. Thus, for any studied routing protocol, the base station 
can initiate creation of secure routing path by diffusion of “Data Request” message which is protected 
with Group Key. Also, the intermediate nodes proceed with the same way, until leaf nodes of the network 
are reached. In consequence, each node having significant data, it will be able to send secure “Data 
Response”, protected with Pairwise Key, via the best gradient. 
It is obviously that a MAC field must be added to routing protocols messages to permit to check 
integrity and authenticity of the message origin. A flag can be added to indicate if the payload is 
encrypted.    
3.4. Secure WSN Reorganization  
When base station expresses a new need for data, the first phase of the routing protocol will consist in 
a secure diffusion of "Data Request" message. This allows a secure reorganization of the WSN, hence a 
secure retracing of multi-hop routing paths. 
3.5. Key refresh 
To maintain security in WSNs, shared keys should be efficiently refreshed with local process. 
Therefore, a Group Head can easily redistribute a Group Key with multicast message. Also, a group 
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member node can refresh Pairwise Key with the Group Head. Key refresh messages can be protected with 
shared keys. Further more, when a sensor node is compromised or it leaves the WSN, a non compromised 
node deletes the shared keys with it. Thus, a concerned Group Head initiates a local Group Key 
redistribution with each member protected by the Pairwise Key. 
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Fig. 1. (a) Flowchart of Group Key distribution process; (b) Flowchart of pairewise key distribution process 
4. Security analysis 
In this section, we are analyzing the immunity of the key distribution scheme against the most known 
attacks in WSNs. 
• Data flow blocking: the key distribution scheme initiates communication by diffusion of “Path 
Discovery” message. This makes it difficult for an adversary to prevent the arrival of messages to 
sensor nodes.  
• Physical attacks:   In hostile environment, some sensor nodes can be captured and tampered. 
Obviously, the most sensitive information is shared keys. The impact of such attack affects only secure 
links with immediate neighbors and not the whole network.  
• Replay attack:  if an attacker tries to replay old messages, this does not hold because every node stores 
the last nonce.  
• Black hole: if an attacker with high communication capabilities rebroadcasts a message, it cannot 
create a black hole in the WSN because it can't be authenticated by sensor nodes. 
• Sybil attack : even if an attackers takes multiple identities, this does not hold because it can’t be 
authenticated 
• Flooding attack: this attack does not hold because non authenticated message are rejected. 
• Brute force attack: the secure key distribution scheme permits to refresh Group Key and Pairwise Key 
which limit the effect of this attack. 
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5. Comparison with other existing  protocols 
In literatures, other key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed for securing WSNs having 
similar organization. SNEP [14] is a KDC based on key pre-distribution scheme. Before deployment, 
each node is preloaded with a symmetric key shared between itself and the base station. If two nodes want 
to share a Pairwise Key, it is essential that they communicate with the base station which establishes a 
Pairwise Key for them. If the WSN uses multi-hop routing paths, SNEP will cause a high communication 
overhead. To reduce such required channel capacities a solution, in [17] consisting in incorporating SNEP 
in the routing protocol. As a result, messages size was increased. This is not effective because Pairwise 
Key refresh is not required in each data dissemination.  
To authenticate the broadcast of “Path Discovery” message, neither asymmetric cryptography nor 
µTesla[8]  is convenient. Indeed, asymmetric cryptography requires high computing. In addition, µTesla
relies on the delayed disclosure key and one-way function key chains. It requires that base station and 
sensor nodes to be loosely time synchronized. Besides, the one-way key chain does not fit into the 
memory of a sensor node. As a result, µTesla only permit authenticated broadcast of the base station. 
However our key distribution scheme needs to authenticate also intermediate nodes (Group Heads) in 
order to share securely Group Key. The use of a preloaded Global key for limited period of time allows to 
cure these drawbacks. In fact, initial broadcast of “Path Discovery’ message is authenticated and KDC 
functionalities are delegated to authenticated Group Head. All this prepares such solution to secure 
efficiently data-centric routing protocols mentioned above. 
Our earlier work SecOPP [18], proposes a secure version of «One Phase Pull» protocol where the key 
distribution scheme is incorporated in the routing protocol. As a result, routing messages length increases 
for next subscription to data. Furthermore, concerning the routing protocols providing only one gradient, 
when a secure link between a source node and its gradient are lost, the source node will be unable to join 
the network during the next secure reorganization. As a consequence, source nodes will be isolated from 
the network as well as nodes which are connected to them.  To overcome such a problem, our current key 
distribution protocol permits each node to share keys with several routers having little or equal height.  
6. Simulations and results 
To check functionalities of the proposed key distribution scheme, simulations are made with TOSSIM 
under TinyOS using NesC language [19] [20]. Sensor nodes are deployed in a random greed. Base station 
is located in the left higher corner. The signal range is about 10 feet. A lossy radio model is used with 
TOSSIM. Initially, we tested routing protocols to be protected with different network size.  In order to 
make sure that sensed data arrives at the base station, we tested a light weight data centric routing 
protocol such as «One Phase Pull» diffusion. After doing 3 tests for each network size, we noted that 
when the sensor nodes number exceeds 90, diffusion of “Data Request” messages does not reach certain 
leaf nodes. They will be considered as orphan nodes. Picture (a) of Fig. 2 shows the obtained topology 
when «One Phase Pull» is deployed to a WSN having 80 sensor nodes. Hence, we will be contented to 
secure these routing protocols for networks having less than 100 nodes.  
           
Fig. 2. (a) WSN topology obtained with OPP; (b) Secure WSN topology obtained with the key distribution scheme
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Simulation results show that Group key and Pairwise key are well shared in the WSN. The picture (b) 
of Fig. 2 shows the obtained topology when the proposed key distribution scheme is performed. Indeed, 
the WSN is organized in hierarchical groups. Furthermore, it makes possible the nodes to have more than 
one secure link towards base station. Such topology provides a secure WSN reorganization.  
We have calculated necessary time so that the key distribution scheme achieves Group key and 
Pairwise key distribution. Remembering at the end of Group Key distribution, Global Key is removed 
from all sensor nodes. Picture (a) of Fig. 3 shows the required time for different network size.   
The curve which presents the necessary time to distribute Group Key shows well that Global Key can 
be removed before deployment time reaches 10 seconds.  Indeed, for a WSN which contains 90 nodes the 
Global Key is removed from each sensor before 9 seconds.  
To check contributions of the proposed key distribution scheme carried out in paragraph 5, the earlier
works [14] [17] based on the use of one KDC are simulated with the same platform. The picture (b) of 
Fig. 3 presents a comparison in terms of necessary time. The curves of the proposed key distribution 
scheme are well placed at the lower part. The effectiveness of our scheme is more visible when the 
number of nodes increases. This explains its scalability. 
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Fig. 3. (a) Proposed key distribution scheme: Time to distribute Group and Pairwise keys; (b) One KDC compared to the proposed 
scheme 
To be sure that our key distribution scheme can be easily joined to data-centric protocols, it is 
simulated with the «One Phase Pull» for different network size. After key distribution, a secure interest 
message is diffused with such parameters: Attribute/value: temperature>40°C, Interest expiration is 200 
Seconds, Sending frequency is 1. Simulation results show that sensed data reaches securely base station. 
In addition, execution time of this secure version is compared to the earlier work SecOPP [18]. Curves in 
the picture (a) of Fig. 4 show clearly that the proposed secure version of «One Phase Pull» diffusion 
routing protocol is more efficient than SecOPP. 
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Fig. 4. (a) Comparison between SecOPP and the proposed secure OPP joined to the key distribution scheme  
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7. Conclusion 
Our secure solution gives an efficient key distribution scheme to the studied data-centric routing 
protocols. It provides local process to share Group Key and Pairwise Key in hierarchical WSNs. 
Furthermore, it allows secure WSN reorganisation. Security analysis explain that it can withstand several 
attacks against WSNs. Simulations illustrate that it is scalable and more efficient than earlier works which 
are based on One KDC. All these show that our proposed key distribution scheme is suitable to secure the 
studied data-centric routing protocols. In the future, we will provide a formal proof of security properties 
for the proposed scheme. In addition, we will demonstrate all these results with analytical study.   
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